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ABSTRACT
A model is presented in which first entrants obtain
demand advantages that can be used, if scale economies are
present, to deter any later entry. Firms do not advertise,
and buyers are rational but unable to judge the quality of
new brands of experience goods prior to purchase. A buyer's
favorable experience with a pioneering brand changes the
standard used when deciding to try the offerings of later
entrants. This effect is shown to be robust against a variety
of changes in assumptions, and some of its implications for
research and policy are discussed.
August 1980
0o740334
Joe Bain's seminal empirical work on conditions of entry led him
to conclude that product differentiation advantages of established sellers
are the most important barrier to entry. As he put it, "the advantage to
established sellers accruing from buyer preferences for their products as
opposed to potential-entrant products is on the average larger and more
frequent in occurrence at large values than any other barrier to entry"
(p. 216). Treating advertising as a proxy for product differentiation, a
sizeable literature has attempted to test this assertion by relating
advertising to profitability in cross-section.l Bain's own discussion
of product differentiation advantages does not point in this direction,
however. He concludes that advertising does not seem to be the central
force at work:
All of these things might seem to suggest the existence
of fundamental technical considerations, institutional
developments, and more or less fundamental consumer
traits which make possible or even very probably the
development of strong and stable product-preference
patterns. They may also suggest that advertising per
se is not necessarily the main or most important key
to the product-differentiation problem as it affects
intra-industry competition and the condition of entry.
Although instances are found in which it is, we may
need in general to look past advertising to other
things to get to the heart of the problem. (p. 143)
Bain does not explicitly describe the mechanism by which product
differentiation advantages of established sellers are created, but a
number of his remarks point toward buyer uncertainty about product quality
as centrally involved. Thus he states that within his sample of industries,
"the allegiance of consumers to established products in areas in which
they are ignorant or uncertain concerning the actual properties of
products is quite important" (p. 130).2 This suggests that in at least
some cases, established firms' advantages might rest on such ignorance
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or uncertainty, so that being first in a market and becoming known by
consumers might be more important than merely spending a lot on advertising.
Conventional wisdom in marketing and scattered empirical research both
support the notion that there are important advantages to being the first
entrant in some markets. Marketers generally predict little success for
"me-too" brands, those claiming to be identical to established brands but
selling at a lower price. Ronald Bond and David Lean (1977, 1979) find
that important and long-lived advantages are enjoyed by pioneering brands
of prescription drugs, advantages that can be overcome by later entrants
only if they offer distinct therapeutic benefits, not just lower prices.
Ira Whittin's study of cigarette market segments points in this same
direction, as do the cross-section analysis of marketing costs by Robert
Buzzell and Paul Farris and the study of order-of-entry effects reported
by Glen Urban and his associates. Finally, experiments described in the
marketing literature by W.T. Tucker, J.C. McConnell, and others reveal
that consumers are willing to pay a premium to continue purchasing brands
with which they have acquired experience, even when all "brands" are identical
in appearance and in fact.
This essay presents and explores a simple market model in which rational
buyer behavior in the face of imperfect information about product quality
gives long-lived advantages to pioneering brands. This model neglects
advertising entirely and is thus consistent with Bain's apparent feeling
that consumer uncertainty could be more important than advertising outlays in
establishing production differentiation entry barriers.4 The next section
describes the assumptions and notation employed and outlines the analysis
of Sections II-V. Our findings and their implications for future research
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and for public policy toward what Bain (p. 143) termed "the product-
differentiation problem" are summarized in Section VI.
I. Assumptions and Notation
Consider a narrowly-defined product class, like freeze-dried instant
coffee or stainless steel razor blades, such that individual consumers can
be sensibly modeled as using at most one brand in the class at any instant.
It is assumed for simplicity that brands in this class either "work" or
"don't work"; they either perform as a brand in this class should, or they
fail to perform acceptably. This makes it possible to describe uncertainty
about the quality of a new brand by a single parameter, the subjective
probability that it won't work. It is assumed that these products are what
Phillip Nelson (1970) christened "experience goods", so that the only way a
consumer can resolve uncertainty about quality is to purchase a brand and
try it. One trial is both necessary and sufficient to determine whether or
not any single brand works. After a consumer has tried a brand, its trademark
provides complete information about its quality. (Word-of-mouth spread of
quality information is thus assumed away; its impact is discussed briefly in
Section V, below.)
Consumers differ in their valuation of brands in this class. Let the
function Q(v), 0 < v < V, give the number of consumers willing to pay at least
v for a brand in this class that is certain to work. Suppose that prior to
the introduction of the first brand, all consumers have subjective probability
T that it will not work. Each values a unit that doesn't work at (-v),
with a non-negative constant that is the same for all consumers. (One
might have > 0 for a bleach that could ruin clothes, for instance.)
The time between purchases is assumed constant and equal to one period.
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Trial of a new brand thus consumes the entire normal inter-purchase time.
(It is shown in Section V that this assumption is inessential.) Let the
corresponding one-period discount rate, assumed common to all consumers, be r.
All else equal, more frequent purchase implies a smaller value of r. The
assumption that all consumers have the same values of aT, , and r is not as
restrictive as it might appear. Much of what follows can be interpreted as
applying to a subset of consumers with common values of these parameters,
with more general results obtainable by aggregation over all such subsets.
Consumers are assumed to be risk-neutral, to have infinite horizons, and to
behave rationally.5
Consumers are perfectly informed except about product quality, and their
tastes are fixed, so that neither informative nor persuasive advertising
occurs. For simplicity, it is assumed that all brands actually marketed
work, even though consumers initially attach a positive probability to their
not working. Thus the value of any brand's trademark rises every time a
consumer tries that brand for the first time. There is no contradiction here.
As Nelson (1974) and others have pointed out, it is difficult for sellers to
transmit quality information for experience goods to rationally skeptical
buyers. All brands are assumed to have identical production costs; they
differ only in the order in which they appear on the market.
The analysis below considers a two-stage scenario. In the first stage,
a pioneering brand enters the market and attains steady-state equilibrium.
Since consumers are initially skeptical about its quality, the first brand
might be expected to find it optimal to charge a low introductory price to
induce trial and then raise the price once consumers have verified that the
brand does work. The effectiveness of such a strategy must depend in part
on the extent to which consumers initially forsee subsequent price changes.
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Section II analyzes the first brand's pricing problem under the extreme
assumption of static expectations. Section IV examines the implications of
the opposite extreme assumption of perfect foresight.
In the second stage of the scenario, a second, objectively identical
brand appears on the market. In order to focus on the effects of order of
entry, it is assumed that the first brand does not change price in response
to entry. This is a much more passive response to new competition than is
usually considered plausible.6 In an undifferentiated world, this response
would permit the second brand to undercut the first by an arbitrarily small
amount, steal all the first brand's customers, and duplicate its profit
performance. Similarly, it is initially assumed that the second brand is also
subjectively identical to the first brand at the time of introduction, so that
the same values of , , and r and the same Q(v) function apply to both. Section
III analyzes the second brand's problem under these assumptions for the case
of static expectations. It is shown that the difficulty of persuading rational
consumers to make a second investment in quality verification in the same product
class produces a permanent disadvantage. If the second brand undercuts the first
only slightly (in a present value sense), it will make only negligible sales.
This asymmetry can be used to deter entry if economies of scale are present.
Section IV demonstrates that these conclusions are equally valid in the polar
opposite extreme case of perfect buyer foresight.
The consequences of relaxing the assumptions that buyers assign the
same initial probability of inadequacy to both first and second brands and
thalt tty kow for I'tarttn the vatilu to tell of an adelquatt brand are explored
in Section V, along with other extensions of the basic analysis.
In Schmalensee (1980), this basic setup is analyzed under the assumption
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that buyers correctly expect sellers never to change price. This assumption
is very ad hoc, but it drastically simplifies the analysis without altering
the basic nature of the conclusions. Since both brands actually work, each
sells forever to those consumers who try it when it is introduced and to
no others. Both brands then have well-defined demand curves, with the
second brand's curve depending on the first brand's price. It is shown
that the second brand's demand curve has the first brand's price as its
intercept. It coincides with the first brand's demand curve only for
prices distinctly below the first brand's price. This means that with
economies of scale, the (common) long-run average cost schedule can lie
everywhere above the second brand's demand schedule even though the first
brand is earning positive profits. The analysis below obtains essentially
the same results without restricting price changes. Since the second brand's
demand curve turns out not to be easily defined in general, however, there
does not seem to be a simple graphical description of the second brand's
disadvantage.
II. Pricing the Pioneering Brand
In this Section and the next, buyers have static expectations; they
expect the most recently observed price to hold forever, even if price has
changed in the past. Suppose that in order to try a new brand, a consumer
ceases for the trial period to use a substitute that yields a non-negative
surplus, s. Assuming away income effects and indivisibilities, one can take
s = 0 for the first brand.
If a consumer would be willing to pay v for a working brand in this
class, trial of a new brand selling at price p is rational if and only if
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the following inequality is satisfied:
(1) Tr[(-v-p)+(s/r) + (l-r)[(v-p)(l+r)/r] > s(l+r)/r.
The first bracketed term on the left gives discounted surplus if the new
brand is tried, doesn't work, and the consumer switches back to the substitute.
The second term on the left capitalizes the stream of surplus associated with
buying a brand that works at price p forever, and the term on the right gives
the capitalized benefit of continuing to purchase the substitute. The left-
hand side of (1) exceeds the expected surplus associated with switching to
the new brand forever by [(/r)(s+fv+p)], the value of the option to switch
back if the new brand is found not to work.
Inequality (1) can be re-written simply as
(2) p < v(l-r) - s,
where the important quantity T is defined by
(3) T =
If T = 0, condition (2) indicates that the new brand will be purchased if
and only if its net surplus, v - p, exceeds s. Larger values of T always dis-
courage trial of a new brand. As one would expect, T is increasing in both 
and , as these contribute to the expected cost of trial. Larger values of
r, which correspond to lower purchase frequency, also increase T . The lower
is purchase frequency, the more important is any single purchase relative to
the entire future stream of purchases. This makes the risk associated with
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trying a new brand loom larger relative to the alternative of sticking
forever with the substitute. If T > 1, condition (2) shows that trial is
so subjectively risky that it will never occur at positive p. To rule this
out, let us assume 0 < T < 1 in all that follows.
If the first brand on the market charges price p, and all buyers with
v > p are sure that it works, its sales equal Q(p). Let (p) be the per-
period profit function corresponding to this demand curve, and let P* be the
unique maximizer of H(p). When the first brand initially appears on the market,
nobody is sure that it works, and condition (2), with s = 0, implies that a
price p will produce sales of Q[p/(l-T)]. Let the profit function corres-
ponding to this less attractive demand curve be T10(p), and let this function
have a single maximum where p = pO*. It is easy to show that [p/(l-T)] > (p)
for all positive p such that q(p) > 0, and that PO* > P*(l-T),with equality
8if and only if marginal cost is zero.
In period 1, let P = V(1-T), and in later periods let P equal the lowest
price previously charged. The demand curve for the pioneering brand then has
the general shape of the solid kinked curve in Figure 1. If p < P, some new
buyers are reached, and profits equal 1 (p). If p > P/(1-T), the only buyers
are those who have purchased the brand at least once before, and profits are
given by (p). If P < p < P/(1-T), current profits could obviously be in-
creased, and no new customers are being informed, so that prices in this
range can never be optimal.
If the first brand adopts what I will call a monopoly Q-constant strategy,
it selects prices p and p to solve
max 0(p0) + (l/r)H(p), s.t. p(l-T) > p0
Since P*(1-T) < PO*, the constraint is binding. This means that the optimal
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policy involves a price of P(1-T) < PO* in the first period and a price of
P1 > P* thereafter. Output is constant over time, at a level below that of
a monopoly with profit function 1(p) because of the extra marginal cost
required to persuade buyers to try an ex ante risky product. This sort of
low/high sequence corresponds roughly to what is called "penetration pricing"
in the marketing and managerial economics literatures.9
I now want to show that the monopoly Q-constant strategy just described
is a globally optimal policy for the first brand, at least as long as no
thought is given to possible subsequent entry. The problem here is stationary,
with the state of the system in any period completely described by the value
of P, the lowest price previously charged. By stationarity, if it is ever
optimal to price above P and thus to leave the state of the system unchanged,
it must be optimal to charge the same price forever afterward. It is similarly
clear that any optimal sequence of price changes must be finite and must end
with a change to a price at least equal to P/(l-T), with that price maintained
10
thereafter. Thus if a Q-constant strategy is not optimal, any optimal
sequence must have prices Pa, Pb, and P charged in successive periods, with
Pc > Pb/(l-T) charged thereafter, Pb< Pa, and Pa less than P at the start
of the relevant period. If a sequence of this sort is optimal, it must be that
1 i O 1 c
H0(Pa( )l+r [ (Pb ) + (Pc)] < (Pb) + (Pa l+r b r c  rc
But re-arrangement and use of results above yield directly
0(P b ) + (Pc) < +rO <(P a)  (P + [Pa/(-T)]
r - r a
- 10 -
This last inequality implies that discounted profits could be increased by
moving to Pa/(l-T) from P rather than going to Pb and P, thus contradicting
the assumption that the second sequence is optimal and establishing that the
first brand's optimal policy must be a monopoly Q-constant strategy involving
a single price change.
If it is concerned about subsequent entry, the first brand might adopt
some other type of strategy. By analogy with the work of Dixit and others,
it might rationally charge a very low introductory price in order to induce
many customers to try the product, then raise the price so that some who
know it works find it too expensive. This initial investment would give the
firm a lower effective marginal cost of reaching additional customers in
response to entry. In order to highlight those aspects of later entrants'
problems that arise naturally, I want to assume away this sort of strategic
behavior on the part of the first brand. Allowing it could only strengthen
the results obtained below at a high cost in added complexity.
On the other hand, little is gained by confining the first brand to
the optimal Q-constant strategy defined above. It is thus assumed below
only that the first brand follows some Q-constant policy, charging price
P1(1-T) in the first period and P1 in all periods thereafter and selling
Q(P1) in all periods. Under any such policy, the levelized per-period
equivalent to the monopoly's average revenue stream is simply
(4) p = (+ [P1 + Pr] = P[1 - - t),
where the last equality serves to define t. Under any Q-constant policy,
then, the first brand faces a demand curve relating levelized average
revenue to quantity given by
_ _ 
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(5) Q = Q[P/(l-t)].
Note that t is always between zero and T. If the first brand were forbidden
from changing price, as in Schmalensee (1980), its demand would be Q[P/(1-T)]
in all periods. The difference between this function and (5) measures the
value to the first brand of being able to raise price after the first period.
It is immediate that t, like T, is increasing in I, , and r.
III. Demand Conditions Facing a Later Entrant
Buyers are assumed here to have exactly the same expectations and
beliefs about the second brand when it appears as they had about the first
when it was introduced. It is shown in Section V that relaxing this
slightly, for instance by letting a smaller apply to the second brand,
improves the second brand's position only slightly; the relation is
continuous.
The second brand, unlike the first, faces two distinct types of
consumer. If the first brand's price is P1, those consumers with v < P1
have not bought the first brand. If the second brand then charges price
p, the condition for trial is simply (2) with s = 0, as for the first brand:
v < P1 and
-l p < v(1-T).
Consumers with high v's are a second type of buyer, as they have already tried
brand one and found it to work. Because purchase of brand one yields a
surplus of (v - P1), the condition for trial is given by (2) with s = v - P:
(6b) v > P1 and
(6a)
___·____ __UIJYI____IIIL1L·I·I-·P--II_
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Condition (6b) shows that consumers with large values of v are least likely
to try brand two, even though they were most likely to try brand one. Their
high valuation of brand one, after they have made the investment of trying
it, gives them a high opportunity cost of trying brand two.
The demand conditions facing brand two in its first period are depicted
in Figure 2. Prior to the second brand's appearance, the first brand
(assumed to have completed the introductory phase of a Q-constant policy)
charges P1 and sells Q(P1). If the second brand charges 2, its first-period
customers are those with v's between the two intersection points of the
P P2 line with the heavy kinked curve. As Figure 2 is drawn, the second
brand sells
Q[p2 /(1-T)] - Q[(P1-P2)/T]
in its first period. This is less than the first brand would have sold had
it charged P2 during its introductory period. Only if P2 is less than
(P1 - TV) are the second brand's introductory sales equal to those the first
brand would have achieved at the same price.
Figure 2 should make it clear that the consumers most easily captured
by the second brand are those with v = P. If the second brand undercuts
the first brand's price sequence, P ( 1-T) for one period and P1 thereafter,
by an arbitrarily small amount, it will sell only to those buyers with v's
arbitrarily close to P Such a policy would give the second brand a levelized
average revenue equal to that of the first brand, P1(1-t), but essentially
zero sales. Under constant returns, entry will occur in spite of this
disadvantage (though at arbitrarily small sale) if P(1-t) exceeds unit cost.
With fixed costs or other economies of scale, however, it should be clear
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that P1(1-t) can be above the first firm's average cost [at output Q(P1)]
without provoking entry.
If the second brand charges any first-period price between P1(1-T)
and P1 - TV, it makes fewer sales than the first brand would have made at the
same introductory price. Since first-period sales translate into informed
buyers willing to pay more because they know the brand works, this difference
is the heart of the second brand's disadvantage. If the first seller of
fluoride toothpaste can persuade those who care a lot about cavities to try
one tube, and if the taste is acceptable to most consumers, the second brand
of fluoride toothpaste will find it much harder to get trial. It will be
compared to a known, acceptable fluoride toothpaste, while the first brand
was compared only to "ordinary" toothpaste.
If the second brand charges an introductory price less than P1 - TV,
which is distinctly less than the first brand's introductory price, it thereby
persuades all those who would have tried the first brand at that same price
to try it. (That is, as Figure 2 should make clear, its first-period
demand is then given by Q[p2/(1-T)], the same function that held for the
first brand at all prices.) It then has essentially the same second-period
options the first brand would have had. (The second brand cannot sell anything
if it charges a price above P, but this is not likely to be a relevant
alternative.) If the first brand could have earned positive profit with a
Q-constant strategy beginning with a very low first-period price, the second
brand will find entry of the same sort attractive. Even with constant costs,
however, is it obviously possible for the first brand to be highly profitable
but entry at drastically lower prices to be unprofitable.
The preceding discussion establishes the existence of a barrier to
entry. Profitable entry deterrence can occur in this model even though
___111 __11 I
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potential entrants have the exceptionally optimistic expectation that
the first brand's price will never change, even if they steal all its
customers. In order to investigate the importance of this barrier in
general, it would be necessary to calculate the second brand's optimal
price policy and the consequences of following it. This turns out to be
very difficult. The argument in Section II establishing that the first
brand's optimal policy involves only one price change can be applied to
the second brand also. The problem is that it is not always optimal for
the second brand to follow a Q-constant policy.
The nature of the difficulty here can be understood by examining the
second brand's demand curve for periods after the first, as shown by the
heavy kinked curve in Figure 3. As above, P is the lowest price this brand
has ever previously charged, and P1 is the first brand's price. Figure 3
is drawn assuming P > P1 - V. The flat portion of the demand curve at
price P1 corresponds to those consumers who have tried both brands and know
that both work. The segment AB reflects those who have tried only the
second brand because they found the first too expensive. A reduction in
P increases the length of the flat segment (moves point A to the right)
as well as that of the declining segment. If the optimal introductory
price is above P1 - TV, it may be optimal to follow a Q-constant policy
and go to a point like B thereafter. On the other hand, since a low
introductory price increases the number of brand one's customers who
engage in trial, it may be optimal to set a low introductory price for
this purpose and then move to a point like A in Figure 3. 1 Finally,
since a reduction in the introductory price moves the whole segment AB
to the right, it may be optimal to move to a point in the interior of
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that segment for periods after the first. If the optimal introductory
price is below P1 - V, on the other hand, point A is unchanged by
marginal variations in that price, and a Q-constant policy must be
optimal. There are thus four distinct strategy types that may be optimal
for the second brand in any particular situation, and it is apparently
necessary in general to compare the profits streams they yield for given
cost and demand functions and fixed P1 to choose among them.
In lieu of any further general analysis, the remainder of this
Section is devoted to an outline of an examination of the second brand's
problem in a fairly tractable special case. Suppose that both brands
have fixed, one-time setup costs of F and zero variable costs. Let
consumers' valuations be uniformly distributed over the unit interval,
and let the scale of the entire market be normalized to unity, so that
Q(v) = 1 - v. If the first brand follows a Q-constant strategy, the
present value of its profit stream follows from (4) and (5) above:
1r - - F= l+r-rT(7) W1 [-I r PQ[P/(l-t)] - F = P1 (l-P1)[ r - F.
Under a monopoly Q-constant strategy, this quantity is maximized by
setting P1 = 1/2.
Suppose that the second brand charges p in its introductory period,
with P - T < p0 < P (T). Then its first period profit (and revenue)
function is
0 0
0(p; P1 ) = [p-
In the second and later periods, if the second brand charges p its profits
are given by
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H(p; p , Pl) = [ p p],
for p/(l-r) < p < Pl. The second brand's objective function is
(8) W2(p0, p; P )= H(p0; P1) + (l/r)TI(p; p P1) - F
If p < P - T, the relevant objective function is identical to that of the
first brand, and a Q-constant strategy must be optimal by the arguments in
Section II.
Let us evaluate optimal strategies of the four types mentioned above.
Considering point A in Figure 3, one can set p= P1 in (8) and maximize W2
0
with respect to p . Under the assumption r < 1, the maximum occurs at the
lower corner where p = (P1 - T) and all brand one's customers have been
persuaded to try brand two. Let WA be the value of W2 corresponding to
0this strategy. Considering point B in Figure 3, one can set p = p (l-l)in (8) and again maximize with respect to p . If P1 > 2T/(l+T), W2 is
0
again maximized at the point p = P1 - T. To simplify things here and below,
let us assume that P1 takes on its monopoly value, 1/2, and that T < 1/3, so
that this corner solution is the relevant one. Direct comparison then
establishes that the corresponding value of W2, call it 2, strictly
exceeds WA.
The third strategy type involves p /(l-T) < p < Pi corresponding to
points strictly between A and B in Figure 3. If such a strategy is optimal,
0
the value of p that yields an unconstrained maximum of H(p; p , P), call
it p*(p ; P1) must lie in this interval. (f not, the optimal price in
periods after the first must be a corner solution at one of the endpoints.)
Substituting p*(p0 ; P1) into (8) and differentiating, one finds that
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W2 [p0 , p*(p0 , P1); P1] is decreasing in p over the entrie relevant
range as long as (1+4r) < 1. Assuming this last condition satisfied,
as it is when r < 1/2 under our assumption that T < 1/3, and using
Pi = 1/2, the relevant lower bound on p0 turns out to be P1 - T
= P1(1-T)/(1+T). At this point, however, p*(p ; P1) = p /(l-T), and we
are at a point like B once again. Under these assumptions, in short,
there exists no optimal strategy of the third (interior) type. Finally,
the optimal Q-constant strategy for p < P - T must have this constraint
holding with equality, since the objective function is the same strictly
concave one that held for the first brand and that is maximized at
0
p = (1 -T)/2 > (1/2) - . We are again at a point like B in Figure 3;
this fourth strategy type also yields a present value of profits equal to
(9) W2 = (/4)[(1-2T)(l+r-rT)]/[r(1-T)2] - F.
Setting P1 = 1/2 in (7) and substituting into (9), we can relate
the first brand's present value to that of an optimally-managed second
brand:
(10) = [W1 + F][1 - t - F.2 1 T)
If = 0, W2 = W1, and there is obviously no barrier. If F = 0, so that
there are no scale economies, W2 is positive if and only if W1 is positive.
The second brand may be less profitable than the first, but its entry is not
thereby deterred under our assumptions. In general, it is clearly possible
for W1 and F to be positive and yet for 2 to be negative. The parameter T
completely describes the magnitude of the second brand's demand disadvantage.
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The larger is T, the harder it is in general for both first and second
brands to induce trial, and the worse is the relative position of the
second brand in this example.
IV. Implications of Perfect Foresight
The assumption of static expectations used above no doubt understates
buyer sophistication in many situations. Experienced consumers have
certainly observed low/high "penetration pricing" more than once. More-
over, new products are sometimes introduced at prices that are labeled
"Introductory" and that sometimes are even described as being some definite
amount below "Regular List Price". If "Regular List Price" serves as an
indicator of quality, sellers may find it in their interest to reveal plan-
ned post-introduction price increases to buyers.12 Though it undoubtedly
overstates both buyer sophistication and seller predictability in many
situations, the assumption of perfect foresight regarding price changes
does illuminate the general implications of forward-looking behavior. It
is an extreme assumption that is fairly tractable and should serve, along
with the opposite extreme assumption of static expectations, to bound
actual consumer behavior in this context.
Under perfect foresight, any consumer's purchasing behavior depends
on the entire future time-path of prices. But this picture becomes
descriptively less plausible the more complex the time-path considered.
Moreover, one rarely observes "penetration pricing" strategies for new
brands involving complex sequences of price changes. Thus nothing of
empirical relevance is likely to be lost if we allow sellers only one
price change, from an introductory price of p to a "regular" price of p.
______
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Similarly, to facilitate comparison with the analysis above, all brands
0 13
are restricted to strategies in which p < p.
If for some buyer s < (v-p), a new brand will be tried in its intro-
ductory period, if at all, with the intention of buying it thereafter if
it works. The condition for this sort of trial, following the development
of (1), is
(6) p < v - s and [(-v-p0)+(s/r)] + (l-r)[(v-p0)+(v-p)/r > s(l+r)/r.
Condition (6) can be usefully re-written as
(7) p < v - s and P r + (1-r) < v(l - ) - s.
It is possible for consumers with s > (v-p) nonetheless to try a new brand
in the first period, with no intention of repurchasing it, if p is low
enough. The condition for first-period-only purchase of this sort is simply
that first-period expected net benefits be positive:
(8) p > v - s and p0 < v[l-r(l-+)] - s = v(l - t') - s,
where the last equality serves to define T'. Referring to (3), it is clear
that ' > T. Let us assume that risk is sufficiently moderate that ' < 1,
so that first-period-only purchase is at least possible in principle.
To consider the first brand's pricing problem, set s O in conditions
(6) - (8), as above. It is easy to show that if it is optimal for the
first brand to make any sales at all, it is optimal to make sales in all
periods after the first. If this were not true, then (8) would imply the
__l__l__-_-----Y·ll-.1111 L--I---^-C.- -C-^^.·lll· --.· l------·--·II(LIL11111111
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optimality of selling Q(v ), for some v0 , in the first period at v0
per unit, then choking off demand with p V thereafter. Using (7),
the pioneering brand can sell Q(v0 ) in all periods after the first
(since the brand always works) by setting p v0 and p = v[1 - T - T(l-T)/r]
(1-T')v. It follows directly from condition (8) that this p induces
0 0
no first-period-only trial for v < v , so that Q = Q(v ) in all periods.
But this pricing pattern yields equivalent levelized average revenue of
- r p0 1 r' 0(9) P lr £P + -] ) (1 (l-t')v 0°
-+r r- l+r
where the last equality defines t'. Since p exceeds (-T')v 0 for all
finite r, the optimality of sales after the first period is established.
It is straightforward to show that the pricing pattern just described
maximizes the present value of revenues from any fixed set of customers to
be served in all periods. That is, assuming Q(v ) sold in all periods after
the first and neglecting the profit implications of any first-period-only
trials, the pricing pattern just described is profit-maximizing. A
comparison of (7) and (9) shows that p has a larger impact relative to
0p on the seller's present value, a multiple of p, than on the buyers'
cutoff criterion, . Buyers treat the probability that they will ever
pay p after trial as (1-); the seller knows that the product works and
thus treats this probability as one. Accordingly, the seller can increase
the present value of revenues without excluding customers by raising p as
high as possible and lowering pO so as to keep constant. Clearly p can
be raised no higher than v0 if all buyers with v > v0 are to be induced
to try the brand, and this yields exactly the pricing policy described
in the preceding paragraph.
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Let Q(v0) > 0 be the first brand's optimal sales in all periods after
0 0the first. The preceding paragraph has established that p = (1-T')v
and p = v maximize the revenue derived from those sales. The second-period
price, p, cannot be increased without reducing second-period sales. If p
0.is decreased and p increased so as to hold second-period sales constant,
first-period sales are unaffected and discounted revenues fall. If the
pricing pattern just described is not optimal, it therefore can only be
the case that it is better to charge a lower value of p , say (1-T')(v -X),
leave p fixed, and increase first-period sales by [Q(v -X)-Q(v0)]. If such
a change increases discounted profit, however, it can be further increased
by lowering p by the same percentage amount to (v0 - X) and enjoying exactly
the same sales increase in all later periods. But this contradicts the
initial assumption that Q(v0) was the optimal sales level in periods after
the first.
We have thus established that the first brand's optimal policy under
our assumptions when buyers have perfect foresight is to charge P1 (1-T')
in the first period and P1 thereafter, selling Q(P1) in all periods and
receiving levelized average revenue given by (9) with P1 substituted for
v . This is a Q-constant policy, though it differs quantitatively from
those analyzed in Section II. A comparison of (4) and (9) reveals that the
present value of the first brand's revenue per unit is always lower under
perfect foresight, since t' exceeds t. It is harder to persuade rational
consumers to try a risky new product if they know that today's low
introductory price is temporary than if they expect it to hold forever,
all else equal.
Suppose the first brand has followed such a Q-constant strategy and
become established, and consider the demand conditions facing a later entrant.
Buyers with v's less than the first brand's price, P1, have not tried that
IIXI__-III^LIIY -·-·  W -* --I- .-II-Ll ..I1I I---II·-l--··I^LLI·-·II I(---P-·-·-·l--··sI··--·I
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brand, so that conditions (7) and (8) still apply to them with s = 0.
Their behavior with respect to any second brand would thus be given by
exactly the same conditions that governed their response to the first
brand. Buyers with valuations above P1 are buying the first brand and
enjoying a surplus of (v-P1) per period. Substituting this surplus for
s in conditions (7) and (8) yields (P1- v) in place of v(l-T) and
(P1-T'v) in place of v(l-T'), respectively. The difference here is exactly
like the difference between (6a) and (6b) under static expectations.
Experience with brand one has altered the perceived opportunities facing
some consumers in a way that makes trial of brand two less attractive.
As in the case of static expectations, the easiest buyers for brand
two to steal from brand one are those with v's arbitrarily close to P1. If
the second brand just slightly undercuts the first brand's prices, it will
get ust those buyers. Exactly as before, the second brand cannot exceed
the levelized average revenue earned by the first brand, and it can come
close only by driving its own sales correspondingly close to zero. This
means that if scale economies are present, entry deterrence is again possible
even under our assumption of extreme entrant optimism that rules out price
cuts by the first brand.
If the second brand elects to enter at a very low price, it can
experience the demand conditions the first brand would have faced, just
as under static expectations. If the second brand sets p and p so that
P1 - TV, it will induce all of brand one's customers to try its product.
It will then have essentially the same options that the first brand would
have had, had it elected to charge such low prices. If the second brand
sets p between P (1-T) and P1- TV,some buyers regularly consuming the first
brand will rationally elect not to try the second, so that the second brand
I -
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will wind up with lower sales than the first would have had. As in the
case of static expectations, it may not be optimal for the second brand to
follow a Q-constant strategy in all cases, so that evaluation of the
importance of its order-of-entry handicap generally requires comparison
of the profit implications of several different strategy types.
Such a comparison is not undertaken here. The objective of this section
was to establish that in the basic model of Section I, late entrants have a
demand disadvantage, which can be used to deter entry if economies of scale
are also present, even if consumers do not have static expectations. By
showing that a disadvantage of just this sort is present under the polar
opposite assumption of perfect foresight, that objective has been achieved.
The present values of the profits of all brands in this sort of model are
affected by the form of consumers' price expectations, but expectation
formation has nothing fundamental to do with the differences between the
position of the pioneering brand and those of later entrants.
V. Extensions of the Basic Model
For simplicity, this Section treats explicitly only the case of static
expectations. Let us first analyze the implications of buyer uncertainty
about the value of a brand that works. Consider a consumer who treats the
valuation of such a brand as a random variable v' = v + u, where v is a
constant as before and u is a random variable with mean zero and distribution
function F(u). Still assuming risk neutrality, and treating the value of a
brand that doesn't work as non-stchastic, the condition for trial corresponding
to (2) can be shown to be
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(10a) p < v(l - T) - s + z(l-7),
where z is defined by
00
(10b) z {U udF(u) - TvF(u*)}/ {1 + r - [+(l-T)F(u*)]}, and
U*
(lOc) u* = s - (v - p).
The quantity z is multiplied by (1-u) in (10a) because it picks up un-
certainty about the value of a brand conditional on its working. The
quantity in brackets in the denominator in (lOb) is the unconditional pro-
bability that it will not be worthwhile to purchase in periods after the first;
purchase of a working brand is not rational if u turns out to fall below u*.
That denominator is always positive.
If undertainty is negligible or u* is a very large negative number,
both terms in the numerator of (10b) vanish, and z = 0. If the probability
is one that it will be optimal to buy a working brand, condition (10) reduces
to condition (2). On the other hand, if F(u*) = 1, so that the prior pro-
bability that this brand is worth buying even if it works is zero, z is
negative.
Consider the demand conditions facing a pioneering brand charging price
p in its first period. Then (10) applies with s = 0 and u* = -(v-p).
Suppose that F(u) is the same for all consumers for simplicity. Then if
the range of u is finite, there will exist a v large enough so that
F[-(v-p)] = 0 and thus z = 0. The derivative of the numerator of (10b)
with respect to v is
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F'(p-v)[p - v(l-T)] - TF(p-v).
This is non-positive for v > p/(l-T), and it is negative for some v in
this interval if F[-Tp/(1-T)] is positive. This condition means that there
is some chance that a working brand will not be repurchased: if v = p/(l-T)
and u < - p/(l-T), the consumer's actual valuation, v' = v + u, is less than
p and purchase of the working brand is not optimal. If this condition is
satisfied, it follows that z is positive in a neighborhood of the cutoff
valuation under certainty, v = p/(l-T).
Thus some consumers with expected valuations below this critical level
are induced to try the product because of their uncertainty about its value
to them.14 The possibility of low values of u does not offset the
possibility of high values for households near the borderline. They will
not repurchase the product if u is below their cutoff; whether it is barely
below or far below doesn't matter.l5 If realized values of u do not differ
markedly from expectations, this increased propensity to experiment enhances
the first brand's profitability. It will generally be possible for it to
charge a price above p/(l-T) after the first period without losing all its
customers.
If trial of the first brand serves to resolve all uncertainty about
the valuation of working brands in the product class considered, later
entrants lose this value-of-information-based demand for trial. The gap
between demands for the pioneering brand and for later entrants can thus
be widened by uncertainty about the valuation of the product class.
On the other hand, if later entrants differentiate their products
from the pioneering brand, they may create uncertain valuations on the
______ ___I ·__I _·____IIIY ___
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part of some consumers. This uncertainty acts as above on consumers who
have not tried the first brand. For those currently buying the first brand,
on the other hand, s must be set equal to (v - P1), as before, in condition
(10). Thus u* equals - (Pl-p) for all those buyers, independent of v. If
F(u*) is positive, there is a positive probability that the new brand will
be sufficiently worse than the old that it won't be worth purchasing even
at its lower price. (By assumption, the expected valuation of the new
brand equals the actual valuation of the old.) It is easy to show that if
this is true, z is positive for v = P1 and decreasing in v. All else
equal, valuation uncertainty makes it easier for an entrant to attract at
least the low-v customers of the pioneering brand; z may be negative for
large enough v.
Thus if later entrants can create enough uncertainty about their
value to potential users, without lowering expected valuations, they may
be able to overcome their other handicaps. It is thus not surprising that
the "me-too" strategy of introducing a product "just like brand X only
cheaper" is apparently much less common than attempts to differentiate new
products from old, to claim new features of which consumers can be.
expected to have uncertain valuations.
Experience with the pioneering brand, or even the observation that
it remains on the market, may serve to reduce consumers' subjective
probabilities that later entrant brands in the same product class won't
work. This effect of course enhances the prospects of such entrants, in a
continuous fashion.
Referring to Figure 2, if experience with the first brand is necessary
and sufficient for greater optimism about later entrants, the p = P1 - TV
locus that describes the introductory-period behavior of the first brand's
___ __
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customers should be replaced by a line p = P1 - T"v, with T" < T. (The
relevant kinked schedule then has a vertical segment at v = P1.) Unless
T" < (P1/V)T, later entrants still find it harder to get the first brand's
customers to try their product than the first brand found it to attract
them initially. Note that small drops in T" help later brands only slightly;
the relation is continuous.
Similarly, if non-users of the first brand become more optimistic
about the likelihood that brands in this class will work, the p = (l-T)v
line in Figure 2 is replaced by a steeper line with the same intercept,
reflecting the lower relevant value of T. Again, this sort of change in
perceptions advantages later entrants in a continuous fashion. (If the
change is sharp and quick enough, some non-users may try the first brand
before others come on the market, even though it no longer charges a low
introductory-period price.) Presumably this sort of second-entrant
advantage is most important for "me-too" brands that do not differentiate
themselves from the pioneering brand, so that this effect and valuation
uncertainty are unlikely both to be important in any single situation.
The formal analysis above has neglected advertising entirely, mainly
to make the point that advertising need have nothing fundamental to do
with a product differentiation advantage of established firms. One could
easily add to the model a requirement that all entrants pay some fixed
amount to inform potential buyers of their existence and price (or price
path in the case of perfect foresight). The demand handicaps facing late
entrants here would then show up as lower returns on this initial advertising
investment. If one added the possibility of engaging in persuasive advertising
in an appropriate fashion, later entrants might find it optimal to match
the price policy of the pioneering brand but to spend more on advertising
_1 I^_LYII__IPILI_*IUI*D-- _ I_---l-Y .^ll---XI(·_··----·1111
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per unit of sales. As long as one follows Nelson (1974) and assumes
that advertising lfor xperence good; cnnnot credll),lv convey comp letl
information about product quality, the addition of advertising to this
model should cause no fundamental changes.
Consumers in real markets do not always rely exclusively on advertising
or their own experience for information about product quality. If information
about new brands is valuable enough, one can expect consumers to use word-
of-mouth and other channels (specialized publications, for instance) to
seek it. If a new brand is sufficiently attractive that condition (1) is
satisfied and trial would be optimal, the expected value of perfect information
about whether or not the product works is easily shown to be (s+p+cv).
This suggests, reasonably enough, that consumers are more likely to search
out additional sources of information for items with high unit cost and
for those with a high subjective probability of inadequacy. The first of
these factors played no role in comparisons between the pioneering brand and
later entrants. Since a great deal of information transmission among consumers
would undo the imperfect information on which this model's conclusions
fundamentally rest, this suggests that the mechanism presented here is
likely more important for products with low unit cost, all else equal.
Finally, it has been assumed throughout that trial of a new brand
requires an entire period. To show that this is inessential, consider
the opposite extreme case in which consumers know immediately if a new
brand is bad and plan instantly to repurchase the best available substitute
if a bad brand is encountered. Then (s/r) in the first term on the left
of (1) would be replaced by [(l+r)s/r] to reflect the planned immediate
switch. This change means that (2) becomes
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(1-') (l+r)(2') p < (1-T) - S[(l )(+r) 
It is messier to work with (2') than with (2), but their implications differ
only quantitatively: a rise in s after trial still disadvantages late entrants.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
In this model, brands enter sequentially, and consumers are initially
skeptical about their quality. When consumers become convinced that the first
brand in any product class performs satisfactorily, that brand becomes the
standard against which subsequent entrants are rationally judged. It thus
becomes harder for later entrants to persuade consumers to invest in learning
about their qualities than it was for the first brand. The demand dis-
advantage of late entrants is such that even if they expect the pioneering
brand not to lower its price if they enter, their entry may be deterred if
economies of scale are present. We have thus found a product differntiation
barrier to entry that has nothing fundamental to do with advertising or
consumer irrationality.
The mechanism presented here seems sufficiently general that it
should be operative in most markets for experience goods. Its importance,
however, can be expected to vary considerably. As Section V noted, word-
of-mouth spread of quality information would seem most likely to render
this mechanism unimportant for products with a high unit cost. The example
considered in Section III found the second brand's disadvantage to be
increasing in . This suggests that high risk (relative to unit cost) and
low purchase frequency increase the height of the entry barrier considered
here. This is consistent with the discussion of the bottled lemon juice
industry in Schmalensee (1979) and with Bain's (p. 142) finding that
---- l^ i_~·_IL_11 .-1~---II^~-I I I Y -
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infrequency of purchase contributes to strong product differentiation.
Finally, it is important to note that a barrier to entry arises in this
framework only through interaction of late entrants' demand disadvantage
and brand-specific scale economies. Bain (ch. 4) was concerned about the
barrier-creating effects of economies of scale in marketing in this context,
but the barrier presented here turns on overall scale economies, which
16
clearly vary in importance across markets. These and related hypotheses
about differences in first-entrant advantages across markets would seem
to deserve some empirical attention.
If pioneering brands enjoy especially strong advantages in some set
of markets, it follows that the sort of "me-too" strategy formally analyzed
here is especially unattractive to potential entrants. If the products
involved are such that differentiation is possible at moderate cost, it
is especially likely to be attempted by new entrants. Thus, where the
mechanism considered here is important, the quality-matching, price-cutting
competition most commonly assumed in economic analysis is likely to be
unimportant. Successful entrants will generally have differentiated them-
selves sufficiently from their predecessors as to appear "pioneering" to
at least a sizeable segment of buyers. A mainstream industrial organization
economist might be inclined to treat the product differentiation and non-
price rivalry in such a market as a cause of entry barriers, but this
analysis suggests that these features may be themselves caused by the same
underlying basic conditions that give pioneering brands important demand
advantages.
If this model captures important features of what Bain (p. 143)
called "the product-differentiation problem", that problem has no easy
solution. All parties here behave rationally and use as much information
as they can generally be expected to have. Pioneering brands
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should generally be rewarded, on average, for innovating and bearing risk.
After a new and ex ante risky brand has become established, its trademark
performs the valuable function of transmitting information about quality to
experienced buyers, information that is not easily transmitted in other
ways. By granting pioneering brands exclusive use of their trademarks
forever, society grants something like a patent with infinite life. As
with patent policy, trademark policy can onlyabe analyzed in second-best
terms. Like the patent grant, the potential monopoly position of pioneering
brands trades off static efficiency against the incentive to innovate.
In both cases, firms may luckily reap large rewards from small risks.
Situations in which pioneering brands manage to use their demand advantage
to deter entry for long periods seem unlikely to have any particularly
attractive optimality properties. Nothing relates the size of the risk
borne to the level of the profit stream enjoyed, except possibly in some
average sense. It is no easier to analyze particular proposed changes in
the length or terms of the trademark grant than to perform the corresponding
analyses of patent policy. As is often the case in second-best situations,
decisions logically turn on very difficult questions of fact.
Such questions may only be answerable for particular industries after
careful study, if even then. In any case, those concerned with antitrust
or consumer information policies might check for the importance of the
effect modeled here when subjecting individual markets to special scrutiny.
If a product differentiation barrier based on consumers' inability to
assess product quality is found in some case to be of unusual and excessive
importance, novel industry-specific remedies, perhaps involving changes in
the life or character of individual trademarks, might well be warranted.1 7
Remedies forcing or facilitating dissemination of quality information may also
be attractive.
----- - -·
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FOOTNOTES
*Professor of Applied Economics, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. This paper was made possible by research
support from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and made better by
conversations with Steven Salop. I am grateful for both inputs, though
only I can be held responsible for shortcomings of the final output.
1. William S. Comanor and Thomas A. Wilson provide a valuable survey of
this literature; see also Schmalensee (1980, esp. Sect. 3).
2. See also his remarks on pages 116 and 142 and elsewhere in chapter 4.
3. For typical statements, see Kenneth Runyon (p. 214) or J. O. Peckham.
4. Christian von Weizs'cker (ch. 5) considers a basically competitive
model of this sort of situation. The model of first-entrant advantages
presented by Bond and Lean (1979) relies heavily on advertising. The
development here traces its ancestry to the very special model in the
Appendix of Schmalensee (1979).
5. Consumers are assumed not to be sufficiently clever as to infer a
brand's quality from such things as its advertising level, price, or
mere existence. On this sort of neglect of signalling considerations,
see the discussion in Schmalensee (1978).
6. See, for instance, Avinash Dixit and the references he cites.
7. The value of quality information also encourages purchase in a more
complex dynamic setting in the work of Sanford Grossman, Richard
Kthlstrom,  and Leonard Mirman. See also the discussion of uncertain
values in Section V, below.
8. If C[Q] is the total cost function, we have (p) = pQ(p) - C[Q(p)],
and 11 (p) = pQ[p/(l-T)] - C[Q(p/[l-T])]. The first assertion in
Fhe text follows fom inspection, the second follows from inspection
-----111·1-
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of the first derivatives of these functions and the assumption of
strict concavity.
9. Joel Dean provides a brief discussion and a comparison with the
alternative high/low strategy usually called "cream-skimming". The
proof below that a Q-constant, penetration pricing strategy is optimal
here seems to depend heavily on the basic non-durability of the product
considered. Cream-skimming uses durability to separate markets in
different periods so that intertemporal price discrimination can exploit
either consumers' tendency to underestimate future price declines or,
under perfect foresight, differences among buyers' intertemporal
preference structures: compare Karl 6fren and Nancy Stokey.
10. If price changes only a finite number of times and the final change
is to a price less than P/(l-T), profits can be increased by charging
P/(1-T) instead of that final price. If it is optimal to change
price an infinite number of times, stationarity implies that price
is monotone decreasing tending toward some non-negative limit, call
00 00 co
it P (-T). Then per-period profit approaches '[P (1-T)] < (P ),
X co
with equality holding if and only if P = 0. If P < P*, such a
sequence is dominated by one that involves increasing price to P*
as soon as a price below P*(l-T) is charged in the original sequence.
If P > P*, the uniqueness of P* implies that one can find P' > P
such that 1T(P ) > 7r(P') > T' [P (-T)], and profit can be increased
by charging P' for all periods after the original price sequence drops
below P' (1-T). Thus it cannot be optimal to change price infinitely
often.
i. _ I
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11. If the first brand has followed a monopoly Q-constant policy, P1
exceeds the static, perfect information monopoly price, as Section
II noted. Thus marginal revenue just to the right of point A in
Figure 3 exceeds the first brand's equilibrium marginal cost. If
the second brand's marginal cost at the relevant output is no larger,
some equilibrium sales to new customers may thus be optimal.
12. Kent Monroe surveys the extensive literature on the use of price
as an indicator of quality.
13. Based on the analysis of Stokey and the results in Section II, above,
I conjecture that a strategy of this form is in fact optimal here,
but I have not proven this to be true. Note that if p > p, some
consumers may rationally wait until the second period to buy.
14. If consumers were risk-averse, this might well be reversed; see
the Appendix to Schmalensee (1979).
15. The analogy to valuation of stock options is immediate. Here as
there, only one tail of the relevant distribution matters, so that
increases in variance, all else equal, tend to enhance value. Mark
Rubinstein and John Cox provide a clear and thorough discussion of
option valuation.
16. Michael Spence provides a useful analysis of the interaction of scale
economies in production and promotion.
17. Such a remedy was ordered by a Federal Trade Commission administrative
law judge in the ReaLemon case but rejected by the Commission on
~1[:'i]; 'lste Sl.I LIt (1 979')) for an (.,conomli c anal y I  or t! hi cac
I· _·_l___·IL__^_·_____) I1III
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